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concerned with the values of individual human beings on a global scale; it was the
same whether one dealt internationally or nationally.
Finally, Professor McDOUGAL addressed the issue Professor Kennedy had raised in
describing formalism and the policy-oriented approach as opposite pillars. Professor
McDOUGAL did not know exactly what the critical legal studies people were talking
about. Professor Duncan Kennedy, in the preface to the bibliography in volume 94 of
the Yale Law Journal,had said that the critical legal studies movement had no goals
and no method. Then, what did the movement have? He wanted to know what alternatives Professor David Kennedy proposed, and he wanted to understand exactly
what he was saying.
PAULA WOLFF*

Reporter
HUMAN RIGHTS V. NEW INITIATIVES
IN THE CONTROL OF TERRORISM

(Cosponsoredby the InternationalAssociation of Penal Law, American Branch)
The panel convened at 3:00 p.m., April 26, 1985, M. Cherif Bassiouni** presiding.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI

"What is terrorism to some is heroism to others or when it suits my political purposes it is heroism otherwise it is terrorism."
Terrorism has been defined as "a strategy of violence designed to instill terror in a
given population in order to achieve a power outcome or to coerce a government to
act contrary to its policies and practices." Under that definition terrorism can be categorized five ways:
1. By states against their own populations to preserve a given political regime. Almost all dictators have resorted to it as have a variety of dictatorial
regimes. Hitler's genocide of the Jews and Gypsies, and the mass slaughter of
Slavic people, resulted in millions of casualties between 1933 and 1945. Since
then there have been countless other casualties around the world.
2. By military forces against occupied civilian populations. Almost every
conflict in history has examples; Germany's World War II "war crimes" and
"crimes against humanity" lead all other instances. More recently it occurred in
Vietnam (by all sides to the conflict), in Lebanon (by Israelis and various Lebanese factions, e.g. the Sabra and Shatila massacre), in Cambodia (by Vietnamese),
and in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza (by Israelis).
3. By one or more opposing groups in a multiracial, multireligious, or multiethnic society where political and social institutions have failed to allow these
diverse groups to pursue their coequal rights. That is the case with civil wars and
sometimes secessions. In the 1960s Biafran secessionists in Nigeria were crushed,
and an estimated 1 million persons were killed. In the 1970s the Bengalis seceded, and Bangladesh was created out of Pakistan, but only after 1 million were
killed before India intervened militarily. Ireland, Cyprus and Lebanon are still in
the throes of such conflicts. Claims of national liberation within this category
abound: the Spanish Basques, the French Corsicans and certainly the Catholic
*J.D. candidate, Washington College of Law, American University.
**Professor of Law, De Paul University; Secretary General, International Association of Penal Law.

Northern Irish who do not perceive themselves as English and among whom are
some who seek to break away from England. All such groups readily engage in
terror-violence whenever they can irrespective of where they stand ideologically,
because it is the most effective means to achieve their goals absent peaceful means
to resolve conflicting claims.
4. The same context as above applies to the category of conflicts between a
settler population and a historically indigenous population, such as white South
Africans against Blacks (through apartheid and other means of terror), and
Israelis against Palestinians and vice versa. All groups engaged in this category
of conflict use strategies of terror-violence.
5. Political dissident groups who seek to alter governmental policy or to
change the regime in a country. At one time it was Fidel Castro against
Fulgencio Batista; now it is anti-Castroites against his regime. The same occurred in Nicaragua with Sandinistas against Anastasio Somoza, now Contras
fighting Sandinistas. But while these examples have a foreign interventionist dimension, others do not: the Red Liberation Army (containing former BaaderMeinhoff members) in Germany, Red Brigades in Italy, Direct Action in France
(with some members of Italian and German groups), Cellules Communiste Combattantes of Belgium and the Red Liberation Army Faction of Japan. All have
limited and defined internal political goals, though clearly they believe in world
revolution ("revolutionaries of the world: unite" is still the old standby slogan).
The first of these five categories is the one that historically and today produces the
most harm. People are killed, injured, tortured and abused by the millions. The last
category produces the least harm quantitatively, but it is the one that governments
and the world media focus most upon, at times almost to the total disregard of statesponsored terror-violence. For the first three years of conflict in Cambodia, the U.S.
media said almost nothing, with meritorious exceptions such as the Chicago Tribune.
Even President Carter, an avowed champion of human rights, at first said precious
little, and since then President Reagan has said even less. The post-U.S. repressions in
Vietnam are also virtually unheard of, and the fateful lot of Catholics and other U.S.
supporters left behind has not been noticeably reported. On a much lesser scale, torture and mistreatment of Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West Bank and
Gaza are seldom reported.
The focus of world attention remains riveted on the low-level violence committed
by small groups and producing quantitatively limited harm in the internal context of
struggle for political transformation. Superpowers have found that strategy the easiest
and most effective to pursue in their confrontations. For years the U.S.S.R. exported
revolution and supported revolutionary groups claiming to act out of altruistic ideological motivation. Meanwhile, the United States specialized in supporting repressive
military regimes.
In Western Europe politically motivated terror-violence activity is on the increase.
It will surely mount in the years to come as U.S. missiles are increasingly deployed in
a Europe whose governments are becoming more conservative. The counter-strategy
will be an increase in domestic terror-violence. The tactical objectives of the Western
European groups identified above will be to prevent the expected deployment of Pershings in Belgium and The Netherlands in the next two years and to increase opposition to it in Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy. Unlike earlier fragmented
approaches, the Western European-based groups will coordinate strategies, cooperate
in tactical events and perhaps even integrate commands for specific actions. It will be
a new ballgame with which no European country is now capable of dealing and the
United States even less. Targets of high vulnerability are difficult to protect in free
societies. Electric power plants, water filtration plants, oil and gas depots, electrical
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lines, port and airport facilities as well as nuclear power plants are likely targets.
Blowing them up would produce the most terrorizing effect in any society. Attacks on
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European military installations and
assassinations of mid- to upper-level senior military and defense personnel are likely.
All these targets are difficult to protect, and visible saturation of security has a chilling
effect on society. Counter-strategies tend to be ineffective. Bureaucratic divisions between responsible agencies and international cooperation among such agencies are
among the reasons. Rhetoric is, however, sure to flow. Responses of Western governments have taken different forms; they fall into two related categories. The first is the
increased tactical and intelligence cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies of like-minded countries. The second is increasing cooperation in extradition of persons accused of terrorism and providing judicial assistance in
prosecution of such persons.
Government responses through law enforcement and intelligence agencies are likely
to constitute overreactions, and preventive measures are likely to result in curtailment
of individual freedom and the increase of potential government violations of human
rights. Among these necessary but dangerous techniques of intelligence cooperation is
use of computerized data which cannot be verified by those about whom private data
is computerized and shared with other governments. The effects of such data being
used to affect the private lives of individuals is potentially serious unless a system of
verification and expurgation of erroneous and private (irrelevant) data is not established. In short, a variety of privacy issues arises, as do issues related to freedom of
expression and association. In a study on terrorism and the media I did for the U.S.
Department of Justice five years ago, it was apparent that the sensationalization and
dramatization by the media had, among other effects, that of encouraging more incidents and fostering a climate of terror, fear and impotence in society. These are definitely among the objectives of groups engaging in terror-violence to dramatize or
achieve their political aims. Thus a note of caution is warranted to avoid the mistakes
of overinflating the dangers of terrorism.
REMARKS BY Louis RENf, BERES*

Almost immediately upon entering the presidency in 1981, President Reagan announced a shift in emphasis from human rights to control of terrorism. With this
announcement, the President revealed a false dichotomy-one that has plagued his
foreign policy ever since-because the two issues are intimately connected. More specifically, terrorism and human rights are often opposite sides of the same coin. The
problem of terrorism-by which we ordinarily mean "insurgent terror"-is often occasioned by state deprivations of human rights-what we ordinarily describe as "regime" or "state terror." Regime terror breeds insurgent terror. We can never hope to
control the latter without first controlling the former. Thus, a proposed shift from
human rights to control of terrorism makes no sense.
This is not to suggest that all insurgencies have "just cause," i.e. spring from regime
terror. Quite clearly, even the most democratic of societies may spawn insurgencies,
(e.g. the Red Liberation Army in West Germany; the Red Brigades in Italy; Direct
Action in France). And these insurgencies--especially where they violate the internationally accepted standards of discrimination, proportionality and military necessitymay be genuinely terroristic.
*Professor of International Law, Department of Political Science, Purdue University.

It follows from all this that it is pointless to speak of the control of terrorism per se.
Rather, the control of terrorism must always be contingent upon context, on the nature of the regime within which terrorism is taking place and, where appropriate, the
reasonableness of transnational force. It would make little sense, from the perspective
of international law, to respond to insurgencies directed against repressive regimes
with harsher penalties, higher fences, more guard dogs and space-age protection devices. Indeed, recognizing the principle of "just cause," states in world politics should
consider the reasonableness of supporting the insurgents in such cases, especially
where the insurgencies are conducted according to the international laws of war. Ideally, the judgments of other states here should be determined exclusively by the standards of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and should ignore the presumed expectations
of realpolitik.
In those cases where insurgencies are directed against democratic regimes (circumstances wherein the criterion of "just cause" is unlikely to be met), the control of
terrorism becomes an entirely different matter. In these cases, the protection of
human rights compels vigorous anti-insurgent methods rather than possible support of
insurgents. The reasonableness of such methods is enhanced where insurgents conduct their operations with disregard for discrimination and proportionality.
There are other contexts, however, that are more complex, that may be less amenable to neat scholarly taxonomies. For example, the threat of terrorism that now confronts the United States and its interests abroad flows largely from two sources: the
Reagan Administration's indifference to human rights in anti-Soviet states (e.g. Chile,
Paraguay, South Korea, South Africa); and the Reagan Administration's Euromissile
deployments. Increasingly, the oppressed peoples of "authoritarian" states have come
to identify Reagan's America as an affliction. Recognizing the alliance between their
oppressive rulers and the U.S. policy, they will-more and more-target Americans
as well as oligarchs.
In Europe, as NATO continues with the Pershing and cruise missile deployments,
antinuclear insurgents will escalate violence against Americans and against U.S. installations. During the next year, one can expect a wave of terrorist assaults of this
kind in Italy, West Germany, Great Britain, Belgium and The Netherlands. Clearly,
the only effective way to limit and control such assaults would be to accept very fundamental changes in U.S. foreign policy, changes that would involve a shift from the
present overriding anti-Sovietism. Absent such changes, the United States and its allies will have to rely on measures for improved security, armored vehicles, more and
better embassy fences, electric barriers and mobile security training teams. These
physical measures can never work.
In his introductory remarks, Professor Bassiouni identified possible responses of
Western governments to terror-violence. As he correctly pointed out, some of these
responses are likely to constitute overreactions and could result in curtailment of individual freedom-increasing potential government violations of human rights (i.e. increasing chances for state terror). Again, careful analysis suggests that the most
promising new initiative in control of terrorism-in this case a special form of "insurgent" terrorism-would be early sensitivity to the terrorism-generating qualities of
certain foreign policies.
This raises the issue of individual states that oppose terrorism selectively, or-stated
differently-oppose certain terrorist groups while supporting others. In this connection, the Reagan Administration's position on the Contras is revealing. In distinguishing between "terrorists" and "freedom fighters" (what we might call here unlawful
and lawful insurgents), the President embraces no jurisprudential standard of judg-

ment. Rather, his only criterion is anti-Sovietism. It follows from this criterion that
efforts to overthrow pro-Soviet regimes (even ones with which we have diplomatic
relations) are always conducted by "freedom fighters," while efforts to oppose antiSoviet regimes (e.g. South Africa) are always conducted by "terrorists."
From the standpoint of international law, this distinction has absolutely no validity.
Before we can proceed with the question of new initiatives in the control of terrorism,
we must recognize settled jurisprudential standards that distinguish lawful from unlawful insurgencies. We cannot accept criteria drawn from the desolate clairvoyance
of geopolitics and the Cold War.
The imperative is clear. To meet the requirements of human rights and counterterrorism, international law must oppose repressive regimes and movements whatever
their ideological stripe. It must also support those insurgencies that issue from genuinely "just cause" and that are carried out with due regard for longstanding rules
governing the use of force.
The alternative, for international law, is to become nothing more than an instrument of national policy, rationalizing decisions grounded exclusively in geopolitical
calculations. Sadder still, the day may not be far off when governments no longer
even feel the need to seek legal camouflage to justify their most illegal policies. Significantly, in almost all major foreign policy controversies of the moment-e.g. the Contras and Nicaragua; the U.S. position on South Africa-international law is almost
never raised as a serious factor. When the President declared his "Cry Uncle" standard for determining force levels against Nicaragua, there was little or no reaction to
his flagrant disregard for international law.
International law often is not taken very seriously. One reason for this is that we
have failed to communicate-to publics and to governments around the world-that
compliance with international law is compatible with national interest. Another reason is that we have failed to speak publicly to support independent normative standards, and to oppose national policies in clear violation of international law. For
whatever reasons, we have accepted a concept of terrorism that has nothing to do with
international law. This concept is determined by our respective governments, by prevailing configurations of national and international power and by the sterile syntax of
the Cold War.
We are prisoners of realpolitik, offering lip service to peremptory norms while offering real allegiance to power and ideology. If we seek sincerely to control terrorism, we
must first remind ourselves that lawful definitions are created not by individual governments for adversary political purposes, but by the sources enumerated in article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. And we must remind ourselves
that international law has no place for selective concern about human rights-concern
dictated by ritual deference to East-West struggle.
Today all states are expected to comply with a far-reaching and largely codified
human rights regime. At the same time there is a significant gap between the normative expectations of this regime and actual state practice. In certain instances the
threat of terrorism is exaggerated by governments to justify repression (e.g. Chile,
Guatemala, South Korea, South Africa). Ironically, as repression hardens, the pretext
becomes genuine; the prophecy is self-fulfilled. In these instances, where insurgents
have manifestly "just cause," international legal initiatives should be directed against
regime terror-especially where the insurgents comply with the international laws of
war.
As Professor Bassiouni points out, terrorism has many meanings, including not
only insurgent terror but also "the terror-violence of states against their own people."

In confronting the issues of this panel-human rights and the control of terrorismwe must recognize not only the threat to human rights of "state terror" but also the
exploitation of insurgent terror by governments to justify state terror. To protect
human rights, international law must recognize the dangers of regime-generated antiterrorism hysteria-a hysteria that often produces therapy much worse than the
disease.
A case in point is Argentina. While it was in power, the junta relied heavily upon
the specter of "Communists" and "subversives" to harden and institutionalize repression. Before it was over, the junta led Argentina into the pervasive darkness of state
terror. In this case there are some elements of a "happy ending," since nine former
junta members, including three ex-presidents, are on trial in Buenos Aires, charged
with responsibility for the torture and murder of 9,000 people over a seven-year period, 1976-83. In the absence of an international criminal court, such prosecution in
municipal courts represents an essential means of enforcing the international law of
human rights.
Not every insurgency is an instance of terrorism. The fear of terrorism can occasion
human rights abuse by particular governments; such abuses can be undertaken in the
name of counter-terrorism. What can be done by international law to limit control of
insurgency to genuine instances of terrorism and to prevent state manipulation of
counter-terrorism for purposes of repression? The answer to this question is largely
political. It is not jurisprudential. The answer lies, in part, in controlling the primacy
of geopolitics among states. Unless states begin to reject the prevailing axes of conflict
in world affairs-i.e. East-West polarity-they will never be able to control many
forms of terrorism.
Without such rejection they will also be unable to control genocide-which is the
most egregious form of state terror. Genocide is a crime that did not end with the
Holocaust. In every postwar instance of genocide (e.g. Cambodia, Tibet, Paraguay) a
common factor has prevented remedial intervention by "good" states. This factor is
realpolitik, a dynamic that subordinates all moral and ethical concerns to the presumed requirements of successful global competition.
In this connection, U.S. unwillingness to support antigenocide norms flows directly
from its obsessive commitment to anti-Sovietism. So long as this commitment remains, there can be no effective control of genocidal state terror. International lawyers may continue to focus upon such antigenocide measures as expanded patterns of
humanitarian intervention, extradition and use of domestic courts for adjudication
(indirect enforcement) and creation of an international criminal court (direct enforcement). But these measures will inevitably fail if they compete with the rules of
realpolitik.
States are animated by forces other than an acutely moral imagination. It follows
that before the progressive codification of antigenocide norms can be paralleled by
widespread improvement of enforcement measures, states must come to believe that
steps to prevent genocidal state terror are always in their own best interests. Under
present conditions, the major states in world politics have been willing to abide virtually any evil among their allies for power advantage. The presence of a well-established antigenocide regime notwithstanding, these states continue to act as if
international law does not exist. Vitalized by intuitions of primacy, the major states in
world politics have sanctified a system of murder that defiles our world.
Above all else, the task is to make the separate states conscious of their imperative
planetary identities. To succeed in this task will be very difficult. But it need not be as
fanciful as realpolitikers would have us believe. Before we assume that genocide, ge-

nocide-like crimes and other examples of state terror are a permanent fixture of international relations, we must understand that politics can change. And since law
follows politics, the transformation of lethal forms of competition into new archetypes
for global society can give new and effective meaning to antigenocide norms.
The initiatives must be taken by the superpowers. Before international law can
control all forms of state terror, the United States and the Soviet Union must control
their all-consuming and protracted enmity. As long as the present condition of bipolar antagonism endures, each superpower will continue to accept the most lawless
forms of repression among states that are on its side.
REMARKS BY JOHN

F. MURPHY*

Although numerous crimes have been committed under the guise of combating terrorism, there is nothing inherently incompatible between effective measures to combat
terrorism and protection of human rights. On the contrary, a primary goal of efforts
to combat terrorism should always be protection of human rights. Most terrorism is
directed against democratic societies in the hope that they will overreact to the threat
and take actions that violate human rights principles. By acting contrary to these
principles, a government plays into the hands of the terrorist because of the hostility
such measures engender among the general population. Carried to an extreme, such
actions may destroy the very democracy they are supposed to protect. Uruguay's
response to the Tupumaros is the textbook example.
To be sure, if one's only goal is to eliminate terrorism, a case can be made for
measures that ignore human rights considerations. Torture, constant surveillance by
secret police, suppression of freedom of speech and assembly, invasions of privacy and
draconian penalties for minor crimes do keep terrorism and other crimes to a bare
minimum. That is a major reason why the rate of terrorism is low in totalitarian
societies. The omnipresent and garrison state is not the democratic way; societies
committed to promoting human rights must be eternally vigilant not to adopt the
methods of the despot.
The temptation to resort to such methods becomes greater as the magnitude of
terrorist activity increases. Even such staunch democracies as the Federal Republic of
Germany, Israel and the United Kingdom have reacted to major terrorist threats with
actions that raise serious human rights issues. One can envisage possible future scenarios-perhaps involving nuclear weapons or biological or chemical agents-where
human rights concerns would be overriden by the compelling need to eliminate the
terrorist threat at all costs. Extraordinary circumstances may require extraordinary
measures, but even here one should be skeptical about claims in favor of actions fundamentally incompatible with human rights.
Be this as it may, we have not reached the point where human rights considerations
must be put aside to meet the terrorist threat. Indeed, the United States has been
blessedly free, compared with democratic societies in other parts of the world, from
terrorist activity. It is true that Americans have been a favorite target of terrorists
abroad, but this highlights the crying need for improved cooperation among the democracies in combating terrorism; it does not support the adoption of ill-advised legislation or excessive unilateral actions in the international arena.
Efforts to combat "international terrorism" have long suffered from lack of precision in defining the term. The late Richard Baxter once suggested that terrorism was
*Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law; Chairman, Inter-Bar Study Group on
Terrorism, American Bar Association.

a concept of uncertain legal content and that "[w]e have cause to regret that a legal
concept of 'terrorism' was ever inflicted upon us. The term is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no operative legal purpose." One example of this imprecision is the term "state terrorism," used loosely to refer to such egregious violations of
human rights by state authorities as torture or to actions by a state's armed forces that
violate the laws of armed conflict. To define every act of violence that inflicts "terror"
on its victims as terrorism is to overload that concept to the point where it becomes
unmanageable. The better approach is to maintain the distinction between international human rights law, the law of armed conflict and law relating to international
terrorism. Admittedly, the three areas are not necessarily mutually exclusive: "terrorism" is prohibited by the law of armed conflict, for example. And such violations
of the law of armed conflict as deliberate attacks against civilians or the killing of
defenseless prisoners of war have sometimes been described as violations of "international humanitarian law." Nonetheless, it is useful to maintain these distinctions for
purposes of analysis.
Another crucial distinction that must be made is between terrorism as individual
criminal activity and terrorism as an instrument of war or assassination. The evidence
is overwhelming that Libya and Iran have sponsored terrorist acts against nationals of
countries they regard as enemies or against opponents in exile abroad. There is also
evidence-although here the data are less clear and hence more controversial-that
the Soviet Union and other Communist countries have sponsored similar terrorist activity. Active support of terrorism as an instrument of war is not analyzed usefully as
a matter of criminal law. Rather, it raises the classical issues associated with use of
force by states and parameters of the doctrine of self-defense. The primary concern in
this case is not to punish the individuals who commit terrorist acts, but rather to take
action against states sponsoring these individuals that will be effective in inducing
them to stop such activity without incurring the risk of a major armed conflict.
To give a concrete example, there is substantial evidence that Iran is sponsoring
radical Shia terrorists in attacks against U.S. citizens, property and interests. The
United States would clearly be acting properly under international law were it to use
force to prevent such terrorist attacks. Use of armed force against the individual terrorists to revenge the attacks, however, would be a much more questionable proposition, because, in effect, the United States would be executing persons without their
ever having had a trial, in violation of fundamental human rights principles. As to
these individuals, recourse should be had to the processes of criminal law.
With respect to Iran, sponsor of the terrorists, a respectable case for the use of force
could be made, especially if all other, less coercive means of dispute settlement had
been exhausted. This is not the forum to discuss this subject in any detail. It suffices
to note that use of armed force against individual terrorists and its use against their
state sponsors raise different considerations.
Professor George will be reporting on legislation Congress has recently adopted in
an effort to combat terrorism. None of these measures raises serious human rights
issues. There have been other proposals, as well as actions taken, that raise these
issues in dramatic fashion. Some examples:
1. A proposal advanced in Congress called for U.S. agents to kidnap "terrorists" from any country in which they might be found and to bring them to the
United States for trial in U.S. courts.
2. The administration proposed draft legislation in the last session of Congress that, at least under one reading, would have criminalized furnishing educa-

tional or humanitarian assistance to any group identified by the Secretary of
State, in his sole discretion, as "terrorist."
3. Secretary of State George Shultz suggested in a speech that the United
States might have to use armed force against "terrorists," even at the cost of loss
of civilian lives.
4. In response to Sikh terrorism, India has adopted legislation that, at least as
reported by the press, appears to give police sweeping powers incompatible with
democratic principles.
5. "Death squads" in such countries as Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala
and Uganda have murdered hundreds of civilians, often in the name of combating
terrorism. Similarly, South Africa enforces the harsher dictates of apartheid
under antiterrorist legislation.
To return to the theme with which I began, the gravest danger terrorism poses is the
risk that democratic societies will overestimate the magnitude of the threat and authorize measures violating fundamental norms of human rights and threatening the
democratic principles we hold so dear. This need not be, and it must not be permitted
to happen. Otherwise, any "victory' over terrorism will be hollow indeed.
REMARKS BY

B.J.

GEORGE, JR.*

Much of the current U.S. concern about hostage-taking flows from the seizure of
the U.S. embassy and its personnel in Tehran. Naturally, whether that is viewed as
"terrorism" turns on one's national, political and philosophical background. The nation's concern was heightened by terrorist suicide attacks with explosives on U.S. facilities in the Middle East that caused extensive loss of life and destruction of
diplomatic and military property. Finally, Senate ratification of the International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages created certain obligations on the part of
the United States as a party to the convention. In April 1984 President Reagan transmitted legislative proposals to Congress to enable the United States to combat terrorism more effectively and to punish terrorists. Congress has enacted the bulk of the
necessary legislation, now in force, as Title II, Chapter XX of the 1985 continuing
appropriations legislation, Public Law No. 98-473. Its general title is the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA).
As part of the CCCA of 1984, Congress approved an Act for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking. The provision punishes the seizure or
detaining of a person, coupled with threats to kill or injure the person or to continue
to detain him or her, for the purpose of compelling a third person or a governmental
organization to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition
for the release of the detained person. The language tracks generally the provisions of
the Hostages Convention. The culpability element is intent, implied from the verbs
"seize" and "detain," which are purposeful acts.
In instances of hostage-taking committed within the United States, federal law does
not apply if all offenders are U.S. nationals, all victims are U.S. nationals, each offender is found within the United States, and the governmental organization sought to
be compelled is other than the U.S. Government. The converse of that is, of course,
the more important. Federal jurisdiction may be extended if any offender is not a U.S.
national, any victim is not a U.S. national, an alleged offender as not "found" within
the United States or the U.S. Government is the governmental organization against
which compulsion was directed.
*Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Branch, International Association of
Penal Law.

The exemption corresponds to article 13 of the Hostages Convention, which provides that the convention does "not apply where the offense is committed within a
single State, the hostages and the alleged offender are nationals of that State and the
alleged offender is found in the territory of that State." Most if not all cases exempted
from federal statutory coverage can be prosecuted under the criminal law of the
American state within which the hostage-taking occurred, or under the federal kidnapping statute if the jurisdictional prerequisite of transportation of a victim in interstate or foreign commerce is met.
If an act of hostage-taking occurs outside the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, prerequisite for exercising federal criminal jurisdiction is
that the offender is a U.S. national, a person seized or detained was a U.S. national,
the offender was found in the United States, or the governmental organization sought
to be compelled was the U.S. Government. These requirements reflect article 5 of the
Hostages Convention, which permits rather than requires exercise of criminal competence if a victim of hostage-taking is a national of a state party.
Violators are punishable by imprisonment for any term of years or for life; attempts
are punishable at the same level.
The statute became effective 30 days after the United States deposited its instrument
of ratification of the Hostages Convention with the United Nations, which occurred
December 7, 1984.
The United States is a party to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), but had not fully
implemented it until enactment of the Aircraft Sabotage Act as part of the CCCA of
1984. The enactment went into effect October 12, 1984, except for the criminal penalty provisions which can only apply prospectively to acts committed on or after that
date to meet ex post facto considerations.
The new statute adds the Montreal Convention definitions of "in flight" and "in
service" to general definitions in federal criminal law. It expands coverage of federal
law to military and governmental aircraft, beyond the civil aircraft protected under
the original form. The culpability element has been changed from "with intent to
damage" to "likely to endanger the safety of any such aircraft." The statute covers
acts of violence against any person on an aircraft if the act is likely to endanger safety
of the aircraft; the former provision limited coverage to acts directed against the crew.
A new crime of communicating false information likely to danger safety of an aircraft
has been created. Threats to violate the provisions of the statute are now punishable.
The maximum fine for violations has been increased to $100,000 from $10,000.
Federal jurisdiction has been extended to include an offender who destroys a nonU.S. aircraft outside the United States and who subsequently is found in the United
States. This meets the obligations of the United States under article 5(2) of the Montreal Convention.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was amended. A new civil penalty of not more
than $10,000 punishes conveying false information concerning aircraft safety, knowing the information is false, under circumstances in which the information may reasonably be believed. A new civil penalty at the same level applies to persons who
carry weapons or have weapons accessible to them on a flight or while boarding an
aircraft. The misdemeanor fine penalty has been increased to $10,000, and the felony
fine has been increased to $25,000. Both sections relate to carrying weapons or explosives aboard an aircraft, so that there are now felony, misdemeanor and civil penalties
for aircraft weapons offenses.

The former misdemeanor offense based on providing false information has been repealed and replaced by a felony provision applicable to one who communicates false
information with knowledge that the information is false, under circumstances in
which the information may reasonably be believed. A new threat offense has been
created bearing on threats to do acts which otherwise would be felonies under the
statute "with an apparent determination and will to carry the threat into execution."
Congress also enacted the Act to Combat International Terrorism of 1984, which
authorizes the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to pay rewards of up to
$500,000 for information concerning terrorist activity. The Attorney General's authority relates principally to domestic terrorist activity, while the Secretary of State's
authorization extends chiefly to international terrorism directed against U.S. nationals, or their business or property, outside the United States.
The statute defines "act of terrorism" as activity that involves a violent act or an act
dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or
of any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
of the United States or any of its states, and appears to be intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.
Payment may be made for information leading to arrest or conviction of an individual for terrorist activity, as well as information leading to prevention, frustration or
favorable resolution of an act of terrorism. This would cover, for example, disclosure
of the location of a safe house used by terrorists or location of a hostage kidnapped by
terrorists.
Payments of more than $100,000 require personal approval of the President or the
Attorney General. Congress has appropriated $1 million for the Secretary of State's
program, but nothing yet for the Attorney General's program.
Although a special criminal statute protecting federal officials or employees has existed for many years, there has been concern that coverage of the statute has been
insufficient to protect against terrorist acts designed to affect federal government activities. Therefore, CCCA extended the statutory coverage to "intelligence agency officials." The Attorney General likewise is empowered to add by regulation "any other
officer, agency, or employee of the United States" ot the list of protected federal officers, agencies and employees. Attempts to kill are included for the first time.
Congress was particularly concerned that terrorists and others could attempt to
influence performance of official duties by federal officials and employees, or retaliate
on the basis of past performance, by committing acts of violence against their families.
Such acts might be punished by state courts, but that would not reflect the special
federal concern based on the official status of the persons sought to be affected by a
criminal act. Accordingly, the CCCA now makes it a felony to assault, kidnap or
murder, to attempt to kidnap or murder, or to threaten to assault, kidnap or murder a
member of the immediate family of a U.S. official, a U.S. judge, a federal law enforcement officer or an official whose killing would be a contravention of section 1114, 18
U.S. Code. "Immediate family member" includes a spouse, parent, brother or sister,
child or person to whom the official stands in loco parentis and any other person living
in the official's household and related to the official by blood or marriage. The penalties are all within the felony range and vary according to the seriousness of the conduct of an offender.
The criminal law measures summarized above will strengthen the ability of the
United States to reach acts of domestic and international terrorism and will enable the
United States to fulfill its obligations under the Montreal and Hostages Conventions.

Congress likewise has appropriated substantial funds to strengthen security at U.S.
diplomatic and other facilities in foreign countries, which serves as a form of prevention of terrorist activity. There should be no obvious concern about protecting civil
liberties of persons prosecuted under the criminal provisions of the new or amended
legislation, simply because the full panoply of federal constitutional and criminal procedural guarantees extends to every federal criminal defendant, no matter what the
offense.
REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*

The Attorney General has issued guidelines for electronic surveillance and the manner it will take place. This issue has arisen from a case in Chicago involving hidden
monitoring cameras taking the place of electronic listening devices. The problem surrounds the fact that one cannot limit or specify what the camera will seize as visual or
audio evidence. What are the implications for civil rights?
Concern has also focused on state law enforcement agencies and their ability to tap
into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) to obtain information on individuals suspected of terrorism. The reverse is now in process, where the NCIC can tap
into local law enforcement agencies to "flag" a name, file or case. These are areas of
concern at the domestic level.
There is a lack of information, however, prohibiting an academic discourse as to
what is happening-in these areas of combating terrorism-between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. We are aware of their
respective legal jurisdictions; what we do not know is the path information obtained
internationally takes, or information obtained domestically and disseminated abroad.
This information could be about U.S. citizens abroad, nonnationals in the United
States or relationships between Americans and nonnationals.
A potential danger exists with the relatively easy data flow between agencies. Computers may collect too much information, absorbing more and more data. There
would be a limitation on the Freedom of Information Act. Information pertaining to
national security would not be accessible under the act for purposes of verification or
expungement.
The last area of concern arises out of relations between national intelligence agencies-among Western communities, Japan, South Korea-who cooperate at different
levels. Some, we know, cooperate in regular patterns, but we do not know whether
there is a sharing of data base.
Problems arise out of the inaccessibility of this information for purposes of right-ofprivacy protection or expungement. There is a European convention on the right of
privacy, but even that does not protect the right of privacy in the area of suspected
terrorism.
There is a problem of information corroboration from country to country and from
agency to agency. The rule of thumb in this matter is that if confirmation can be
obtained from two additional agencies, the information is considered valid. A question arises: What happens when the corroborating information was obtained by all
the agencies from the same international source? The danger exists that the process
might snowball in the classification of a person as to his "dangerousness." Real
*John B. Hotis, Special Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was unable to
attend the panel to present remarks on the use of electronics in combating terrorism. The Chairman raised
questions on the subject to stimulate discussion.

